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PANEL 5: FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
MODERATOR: ERIC SEGALL 
PANELISTS: STEPHEN GRIFFIN, NEIL KINKOPF, AND ILYA 
SOMIN 
 
Professor Eric Segall: It is Friday, it is getting late, but we do have 
two excellent panels to go. Thanks for bearing with us for the rest of 
the day. We have Ilya Somin from George Mason, I’m sorry, 
Antonin Scalia, School of Law, we have Steve— 
Professor Ilya Somin: Law School. 
Professor Segall: Law school, right. We have Steve Griffin from 
Tulane, and we have Neil Kinkopf, who most of you know, from 
GSU. This panel is going to be about federalism, and it’s going to be 
about separation of powers. We’re going to start with federalism, 
though these topics may bleed together in some cases. There used to 
be a lot of talk about the Rehnquist Court’s new federalism once 
Justice Thomas replaced Justice Marshall in 1991. Can we talk a little 
bit about what that new federalism was and what role Justice 
Kennedy played in that new federalism? 
Professor Somin: From the 1930s until the 1990s, the Supreme 
Court, by and large, made almost no effort to restrict the scope of 
federal power in a structural way, on the basis that Congress or the 
President had exceeded the scope of what the federal government is 
allowed to do structurally. Beginning in the 1990s with cases like 
New York v. United States in 1992, which I think was the first really 
significant modern case in this area, and then going on to Lopez and 
other cases later, the Supreme Court did begin to revive federalism in 
several ways. 
One is, they said, it is not the case that the federal government’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce means the power to regulate 
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pretty much anything. There are going to be some limits. It’s not easy 
to specify exactly what these limits are, but in several cases, 
beginning in Lopez, they said there are constraints. They also said, 
more firmly, that the federal government at least as a general rule, is 
not allowed to commandeer state and local governments. That is, it’s 
not allowed to say, “We’re going to force state and local government 
officials to help enforce federal law and carry out other functions.” 
They have also, most notably in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Obamacare 
case, ruled that there are constraints that are meaningful on the kinds 
of conditions that can be imposed on the state governments—as a 
condition of getting grants from the federal government. Some 
constraints were there even before the so-called “Rehnquist 
Revolution,” but I think it’s fair to say that the Rehnquist Court, and 
later the Roberts Court, clarified these conditions and restrictions and 
enforced them more tightly than before. 
With respect to the Eleventh Amendment, they’ve taken a tougher 
line on protecting the state sovereign immunity against the federal 
government. Then finally, with respect to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 5, which says the Congress has the power to 
enforce the restrictions on the state and local governments of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate measures, beginning in 1993 
in an opinion written by Kennedy in the City of Boerne, the Supreme 
Court has said that there must be “congruence and proportionality 
 here. That is, there must be some strong connection between the 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by state and local 
governments that’s being remedied and whatever measure Congress 
is enacting,. Things that go beyond that can be struck down and 
indeed have been in at least a couple of major Supreme Court cases. 
There are some other issues as well, but these are the big ones. I 
think it’s fair to say that, in every single one of these areas, Kennedy 
played a crucial role, either by writing important opinions, as in City 
of Boerne, or by providing a crucial fifth vote for what were often 
five-four majorities. Most of these cases were decided 5–4, or 6–3, or 
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in a couple of instances, by 7–2. Kennedy was absolutely crucial to 
the majority. In various cases, he articulated some important 
rationales for aspects of the so-called “federalism revolution,” as 
well. 
So, he played probably as big a role in all of this, as any single 
Justice, perhaps bigger than Rehnquist, who helped begin it, arguably 
bigger than O’Connor, if only because he was around for longer of it 
than O’Connor was, and probably bigger than Scalia as well, in that 
he articulated more of the dominant doctrines. Clarence Thomas 
would have gone further, I think, than Kennedy was willing to do. 
But Thomas rarely, if ever, managed to write either significant 
majority opinions, or highly influential concurring opinions in this 
area of doctrine. 
Professor Segall: Let’s talk about Kennedy’s rationales, because I 
think his view of accountability, which Justice O’Connor mentioned 
first in New York but Justice Kennedy definitely leaped on, played a 
big role here. What was Kennedy’s view of accountability between 
the states the federal government, and the people? 
Professor Neil Kinkopf: Sure. Before we get to that, sorry to object 
to the question. 
Professor Segall: I’m used to it. 
Professor Kinkopf: Eric and I object to each other all the time. I just 
want to add one thing to Ilya’s very fine description of the new 
federalism. That is, crucial to Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor 
was the assertion of judicial power. So, not just that there are limits 
but that it is the role of the Court to articulate and enforce what those 
limits are, which you mentioned at the outset that we were going to 
blend together federalism and separation of powers. So, here we are, 
the first question I think does that. 
So, Justice Kennedy, I think along with Justice O’Connor, 
articulated a privity theory of federalism. That is that our system of 
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federalism, where we split the atom of sovereignty, envisions in 
Justice— 
Professor Segall: You don’t think that’s as good as Mike’s— 
Professor Kinkopf: It’s fine, it’s fine. I just don’t want to be in the 
blast radius. 
Professor Segall: Okay. 
Professor Kinkopf: So, for Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, but 
really for Justice Kennedy, what that meant is there are supposed to 
be distinct lines of communication, of accountability, of sovereignty 
between the federal government and the people distinct from the lines 
between the state government and the people. Neither of those two 
governments should interfere with the relationship—direct 
relationship—between the citizen and the state government if it’s the 
federal government doing the interfering or between the citizen and 
the federal government if it’s the state government that’s doing the 
interfering. 
So, what Justice Kennedy says in case after case, across the whole 
range of doctrinal categories that Ilya laid out, Justice Kennedy tries 
to apply this theory. He brings it up in every one of the cases, and 
says, “The problem with what”—usually it’s the federal 
government—“the problem with what the federal government has 
done is it interferes with the relationship between the state 
government and its citizens in a way that renders accountability 
problematic.” So ultimately, his theory went back to the idea that the 
federal government and the states are supposed to compete with one 
another for the affection of the people, and that would preserve 
liberty. 
That system can only work if the people know who to hold 
accountable for telling them they have to buy health insurance or for 
telling them that a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility is 
going to be sited in their backyard. If the federal government can 
impose that but trick the people into thinking the states ought to be 
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held accountable, well that’s problematic, that undermines our 
system of federalism. So, that idea of accountability is crucial to 
Justice Kennedy. I think more than any other Justice, more than 
Justice O’Connor, who first articulates that in New York v. United 
States, Kennedy adheres to it across the whole range of federalism 
cases, and he does it when it’s the inverse. 
So, in term limits, a case that you didn’t mention, where the claim 
is that the states are interfering with the federal government by states 
imposing term limits on federal members of Congress, Kennedy 
adheres to his accountability theory, his divide-the-atom-of-
sovereignty theory and says, “Well in this case, the states are 
interfering, and we shouldn’t understand their power as allowing 
them to do that.” Justice O’Connor and the other conservative 
Justices all just ignore that in the term limits case. But Kennedy, 
we’ve talked a lot about his inconsistency or his capaciousness, in 
this respect anyway, he was relatively consistent through the cases. 
Professor Stephen Griffin: Well, I was thinking in terms of this 
panel, and some of the others, when you’re dealing with a Justice 
who’s been in the majority side so much, are you talking about only 
his opinions, his work product, or are you talking about the Court as 
a whole? You need to look at both, probably. But when I look at 
federalism, Commerce Clause, I see some distinctions because in 
Lopez, which is both federalism and Commerce Clause, and by the 
way, I agree that these cases merge over into separation of powers. 
It’s hard to talk about federalism and then Congress’s power vis-a-vis 
the states without talking about Congress’s power generally. That’s 
the judiciary versus Congress, separation of powers. 
In Lopez, it seems to me, he carved out a little more of a distinctive 
position, where he said a little more clearly than Rehnquist, “We’re 
not interested in questioning the New Deal, but what we see here is a 
clear involvement of the federal government, and a matter of 
traditional state concern.” So, he makes Lopez a little more about 
federalism than the Commerce Clause simplicitor. But I’d have to 
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say, then I was taken aback by the realization that this Lopez 
concurrence was almost as long as the Lopez majority opinion. But, I 
can’t really quite reconcile his approach in Lopez with what happens 
in the Affordable Care Act case. 
Professor Segall: A couple of more questions about accountability 
because I think that’s really an important topic here about federalism. 
The first one is, it didn’t seem to play a big role in the Raich case, 
where Justice Kennedy agreed that the use of homemade marijuana 
that was legal under state law could be regulated by Congress. That 
case presented accountability, I think, more than any other case, 
except for maybe term limits, because there the federal government 
was prohibiting something the state government expressly allowed in 
a very politically loud way. What happened to accountability in the 
Raich case?  
Professor Somin: I think Kennedy just screwed up and violated his 
own principles, not just on accountability but on the overall structural 
approach to the Commerce Clause and federalism generally that he 
took. He had said didn’t want to upset the existing major New Deal 
precedents, which he noted in that concurring opinion with O’Connor 
that you just mentioned in Lopez. But otherwise, he was going to be 
skeptical about policing new federal intrusions and ones that were not 
required or not specifically upheld by the New Deal cases. Also, as 
he said in another case, Bond v. United States I, Federalism is about 
protecting the liberty of the individual, not just the dignity or the 
rights of state governments. 
 Of course, in Raich we have a person who needed medical 
marijuana, it was sanctioned by state law, she and others like her 
arguably needed this for their liberty, dignity, and health, and he just 
didn’t care. Moreover, he signed on to the majority’s extremely broad 
definition of what counts as “economic activity” that could be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause, which they defined as 
anything that involves the production, consumption, or distribution of 
a commodity, which they got from a 1966 dictionary. That definition 
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occurs nowhere in the Constitution or in the Supreme Court’s 
previous precedents. 
So, why did Kennedy screw up in this, to my mind, very egregious 
way? Maybe it’s just that we all screw up egregiously sometimes, 
including Supreme Court Justices. That’s the null hypothesis. The 
scuttlebutt however, and I don’t know if it’s true or not, but the 
scuttlebutt was that he worried about upsetting the War on Drugs.” 
He may have worried, and the federal government actually argued 
this, that if you allow this with respect to marijuana sanctioned by 
state law, there’d be a slippery slope to other marijuana and then 
maybe to other kinds of drugs as well. 
While he did have something of a libertarian instinct, it was not 
fully and systematically articulated, so he may well have had a non-
libertarian take on the War on Drugs.” I think this may also account, 
at least in part, for Scalia’s concurring opinion here. Though Scalia at 
least said in his concurring opinion, that you cannot do this under the 
Commerce Clause alone. You have to bring in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, too. So, he tried to cabin the damage at least a little 
bit. I think he only partially succeeded in that, but at least he tried.  
Kennedy didn’t even bother to join Scalia’s concurring opinion, 
which would then have been the law, because those two were the 
swing justices. He joined the majority’s, to my mind, extremely 
egregious and largely indefensible opinion, saying that the power to 
regulate interstate commerce includes the power to forbid possession 
of marijuana that was never sold anywhere on any market and also 
never crossed state lines. You have to be aware of— 
Professor Segall: I’m going to take a wild guess that Steve is going 
to object that it’s indefensible. 
Professor Griffin: Yeah. Well, I would just defend Raich on 
Kennedy’s own terms. Kennedy says in Lopez that, regulating guns 
in school zones, regulating guns in such a specific way, this is simply 
not a traditional matter of state concern. But, you just can’t say the 
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same thing about the effort to control drugs nationwide, whether it’s 
a product of the war on drugs or not. Federal efforts to control drugs 
that flow easily across state lines is something the federal 
government’s been trying to do for a long time. 
So, if you’re looking at—if you define it super-specifically, maybe 
the provision of medical marijuana as a traditional matter of state 
concern, maybe you cause a problem for Kennedy. But otherwise, it 
flows fairly naturally from what he says in Lopez, that he’s not going 
to interfere with the federal government, at least as long as they stick 
to their previous knitting. 
Professor Kinkopf: The one point I would add to that is, with 
respect to accountability, I think the public generally understands 
who it is that’s making their marijuana illegal. In that case in 
particular, the sheriffs were there with the feds until they realized that 
Raich and Monson were possessing their marijuana pursuant to 
California law, at which point the sheriffs and the feds stood off 
against one another. So, it was very clear who wanted to take the 
marijuana plants away. It was the federal government. This is an area 
of traditional federal regulation, of longstanding federal regulation. 
So, I think, to Kennedy, it just wouldn’t have implicated those 
accountability lines. 
Professor Segall: Before you respond, I just want to close out this 
accountability—and I’ll give you the last word—accountability 
discussion with I think what Neil said about the Raich case is true in 
almost every case. I think that politicians—Justice Stevens said this 
several times in dissenting opinions—that the people know who’s 
ruling and who’s running their government. I would just very 
quickly, moderator prerogative, tell a very brief story that when I 
moved to Atlanta in 1983 from Nashville, emission control stickers 
on cars weren’t a thing yet in cities below a certain population, 
Nashville didn’t have them. So, I came to Atlanta, and I called the 
DMV and said, “What do I do?” “Get a license,” they told me, said 
nothing about emission control sticker. I got a ticket for not having 
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one. I appealed it to the judge, to the traffic court judge, and I was 
doing well, and I was about to win. Then I made the mistake of 
saying, “I’m clerking for a federal judge. I would follow the law.” He 
said, “This is a federal requirement and a federal mandate, and I hate 
it, and you’re guilty.” They, not just federal judges—people know 
who is making the laws that govern them. So, I’m not sure the 
accountability doctrine has as much weight as O’Connor and 
Kennedy thought it did, but I’ll give you the final word on this. 
Professor Somin: Two very quick points on this. Federal regulation 
of guns dates back at least to the 1930s, roughly the same era as 
federal regulation of marijuana. So, you can’t really distinguish these 
cases based on tradition. On accountability, there is actually a great 
deal of survey data which says that the public is often confused about 
which level of government controls what, which officials control 
what. I actually have a whole book devoted to these kinds of 
questions called Democracy and Political Ignorance. But I do agree 
with you that I don’t think accountability is ultimately the best basis 
for federalism doctrine, and it’s not easy for judges to determine 
where the public really understands who’s accountable for what and 
where they don’t. 
Professor Kinkopf: So, Ilya, I agree with your point completely, and 
I do think it’s interesting to point out that the Court never seems 
concerned about whether the accountability arguments they make are 
right or not. There’s empirical data out there. The Court just asserts, 
“This is, or isn’t, accountable.” In case after case, the Court does that. 
Professor Somin: I agree with you. Do I think O’Connor was 
probably more guilty of this than Kennedy? I think Kennedy, in his 
opinions, was more concerned with either the extent to which this 
creates a federal leviathan that suppresses individuals and the extent 
to which the federal government might be taking over the machinery 
of state governments. But, O’Connor, I think, was more explicit in 
saying that it’s really about confusion of accountability. 
9
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Professor Segall: So, it’s hard to talk about federalism without 
talking about NFIB, the big Obamacare case. I guess I do want to 
bring in the dignity concept that was discussed earlier. Arguably, 
people having—especially elderly people and poor people—not 
having healthcare seems to be a matter of dignity. It wasn’t to Justice 
Kennedy. Steve, do you want to say something about how that case 
fits into his overall federalism jurisprudence? 
Professor Griffin: Well, I quail to think what would have 
happened— 
Professor Segall: You quail to? Is that a verb? 
Professor Griffin: Quail, yeah. I quale to think what would have 
happened if the joint opinion, as I understand it, that would have 
rendered the whole law unconstitutional, if that had had its sway. As 
I understand, that the joint opinion objected to the actual outcome, 
which means Kennedy objected to the actual outcome, where 
Medicaid became an option. Still, they were going to interfere in a 
quite severe way with how Medicaid was delivered. 
For those of you, I guess everyone, living in Georgia, this is still 
an issue, because Georgia’s one of the states that hasn’t expanded 
Medicaid. I can safely report from Louisiana that we did expand it 
two years ago and without ill effect. Without ill effect, except a 
couple of hundred thousand people did get medical care where they 
didn’t have it before and found out they had things like colon cancer 
and diabetes, which they’re now getting treated for. That’s safely in 
the record. 
It’s not really chargeable, as I understand it, directly to Kennedy, 
but there is an insouciance behind the joint opinion that doesn’t 
sound much like Kennedy, but he signed on to it. That is not 
characteristic of what he says in Lopez. So, something got to him. It 
could be—there are these narratives we construct. Ilya gave you an 
example of a narrative, I’ve heard it from Randy Barnett, where 
we’re going in the right direction, we’re going back to constitutional 
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liberty and limits starting with Lopez, and Gonzales was a horrible 
deviation. That’s one narrative. 
Another narrative is, Lopez and Morrison were limited 
interventions on Scalia. I heard Scalia once say, “Why are we 
striking down Commerce Clause laws? Because Congress is sending 
us stupid laws.” That was Scalia in his heyday. There’s other 
evidence saying that the Justices didn’t really have that a high 
opinion of the Gun Free School Zones Act, or what they were 
presented with in the record, and they could have thought maybe the 
same thing of the Violence Against Women Act. But something else 
had to happen here because, clearly, their opinion of the 
administration or what it did sunk to some new low for Kennedy to 
sign on to a joint opinion that to me is not consistent with the 
approach he set out in Lopez. 
Professor Segall: I do think, without being too super-legal realist, we 
could say that the Court upheld the “War on Drugs,” the court struck 
down a gun law, the Court didn’t like the Violence Against Women 
Act statute, and the Court didn’t like Obamacare.  
I want to talk about term limits for a minute because, as I’ve 
mentioned earlier today, the term limits decision, when it came 
down, was absolutely huge. I actually think an argument could be 
made it is one of, if not the most, important decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court because if it goes the other way, we live in a 
different country. If the Court upholds term limits, and I think there 
would have been fifteen, twenty states at least that would have done 
them, we live in a country that’s very different than the one we lived 
in before. Because that would make a big difference to how the 
Congress operates. I’m not saying it’s good or bad. I have no idea. 
But, it would make a huge difference. 
Is that going to come back to us? There might be five votes. That 
was a five-four decision, and Justice Kennedy was the swing vote. I 
think we know how four people on the Court would vote on that 
again. Is there a chance that case is coming back? 
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Professor Griffin: I have one speculative thought on that, but I— 
Professor Kinkopf: My speculation is no because of 1994. So, what 
fueled that was the sense that the Democrats had a majority in 
Congress for decades and seemed to have a lock on it. Even going 
into the wave election, the tidal wave election of 1994, there wasn’t a 
lot of sense that Democrats were going to lose the House that year. 
So, the only way for Republicans, that they saw, to get the Democrats 
out was through term limits. Republicans eventually—Newt Gingrich 
came up with the Contract with America, and Republicans actually 
won the House the old-fashioned way. Since then, I really haven’t 
heard a peep about term limits. 
Professor Segall: Democrats are going to start talking about it. 
Professor Kinkopf: Democrats will talk about gerrymandered 
districts all day long, but I don’t hear Democrats talking about term 
limits. 
Professor Griffin: I think, at the very least, it would all have to be 
recalibrated, both parties, if they thought it was a good idea 
because—each state would have to be recalibrating, “How will this 
affect us and our relative power in Congress if we unilaterally disarm 
in terms of seniority?” Back then, before the decision, there was 
much more a sense of, “Well, this might sweep across the whole 
country.” The whole country would be participating, and no state 
would be necessarily disadvantaging itself if it adopted term limits 
and others did not. But, that would all have to be recalibrated, and I 
don’t know how the politicos would come out on that. 
Professor Somin: A couple of points on this. First, as you suggested, 
obviously this thing has moved way down the priority list of 
Republicans and conservatives, probably for exactly the reason that 
you suggested. Second, I do think it’s possible that at some point, one 
or two states, maybe for idiosyncratic reasons, would try to do this, 
and maybe it would come back to the Court. But if it did, and the 
Court did uphold term limits, I doubt that it would be this big sea 
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change, partly because fewer states would do it than might have done 
it in the ‘90s, and partly because it might not make very much 
difference if they did do it. 
Political scientists find that incumbency advantage has been going 
down in recent years in terms of how significant it is to elections. We 
see that with the House of Representatives changing hands multiple 
times in recent years, possibly again a month from now. So, it’ll 
matter less for that reason. 
Also, with a political system that is more polarized between more 
homogenous parties, at least more ideologically homogenous parties, 
there’s less room for discretion by individual members of Congress 
than there might have been before. So, even if it did happen, it 
wouldn’t make a huge difference in terms of governance. At least 
that’s true for the near future. We can imagine, if twenty, thirty, forty 
years now we’re back in a party system more like that of the period 
before 1994, maybe things would be different then. But, we’re a long 
way away from that. 
Professor Segall: I’m going to throw a question out at you all that I 
did not advise you about, so I apologize. But, in this last term, Justice 
Kennedy apparently gave up on the redistricting issue, which is, I 
think, one of the biggest issues we have as a culture and a country 
today, the whole gerrymandering issue. I think it can be phrased in 
many different ways, it can be phrased as a First Amendment issue, it 
could be phrased as a federalism issue, it could be phrased as a 
justiciability issue, which is pretty much how—were we surprised 
how Kennedy gave up on that? Because once he gives up on it, and 
he retires, we know that this issue is probably going to be gone for a 
long time, and the Court is saying to the political system, “You guys 
work it out.” Was that a surprise? 
Professor Kinkopf: Not to me. I wouldn’t go so far as to say he gave 
up on it. He occasionally would hint that he might be able to see his 
way to something, and he kept this kind of tease going and then 
eventually just decided, “Well, no.” 
13
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Professor Griffin: That’s the way I would put it as well. I’m not sure 
he was ever that seriously interested. Well, it didn’t surprise me that 
he didn’t go for it. 
Professor Segall: Do you think he should have? 
Professor Griffin: I think it would be—there, I would have to defer 
to the voting rights experts on whether there was a standard. You’d 
have to have a standard people could understand. At the same time 
though, it seems to me, the fact that the Supreme Court maybe can’t 
make up its mind, or he couldn’t make up its mind, that is not 
stopping this litigation because there are just some especially 
egregious circumstances still going on there in the states. 
Professor Segall: Let’s move to separation of powers. Neil, do you 
think that Justice Kennedy had a coherent approach to separation of 
powers across the board? If he did, what was it? 
Professor Kinkopf: Well, I don’t know if I’d go that far. But, I do 
think his opinion for the Court in Zivotofsky is really important and 
will continue to be important. So, until very recently, the Court used 
to operate in one of two modes in separation of powers cases. Either 
it was quite formalistic, which tended to be pro-President, or it would 
be highly functional: look at how the law actually operated in the 
world, do a balancing test, and overwhelmingly defer to Congress. It 
would be one or the other. So, you can think INS v. Chadha is 
formalism. Morrison v. Olson is functional balancing. 
Justice Kennedy in Zivotofsky was not formalistic at all but, rather, 
was highly functional, highly attuned to what was going on in the 
case, the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Professor Segall: Give the quick background, give the quick 
background. 
Professor Kinkopf: I’m sorry. Zivotofsky is the case where Congress 
had passed a law giving individuals a right to have their passport—
well, their certificate of birth or passport—designate their place of 
14
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss5/5
2019] PANEL 5: FEDERALISM & SEPARATION OF POWERS 1017 
birth as “Jerusalem, Israel” rather than just “Jerusalem.” U.S. policy 
up until that time—up until Trump took office—was that we have no 
position on what country Jerusalem is in. It’s just Jerusalem. We’re 
neutral as to the sovereignty relating to Jerusalem. 
So, the statute is contrary to that determination. Parents of a child 
born in Jerusalem ask that the passport be designated—bear the 
designation “Jerusalem, Israel.” The case went to the Supreme Court 
as to whether or not the President had to comply with the statute 
because the President directed the State Department not to put that 
designation on any passports or conciliar records of birth. 
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, striking down the 
statute. He employed a highly functional balancing test to get there. 
So, that’s unusual. He employed a functional balancing test but did it 
in a way that was not deferential to Congress, to Congress’ power, 
but rather was highly attuned to the needs of the President. So, the 
case recognizes, in the President, a recognition power, which resides 
in the President by implication from the Reception Clause. The 
Constitution authorizes the President to receive ambassadors, and the 
act of reception is an act of recognition of the country that sent, and 
the government that sent, the ambassador. So that, coupled with a 
lengthy review of history and historical practice, for Justice Kennedy, 
synched the case that the President holds the recognition power. 
But still, the Court had to determine whether or not this 
designation on a passport was inconsistent with the President’s 
recognition power. In dissent, Justice Scalia made a powerful 
argument that it’s not, that the President can recognize or not 
recognize anyone he wants to. Congress has the power over passports 
just like Congress has the power over tariffs. Congress can say that 
goods imported from Jerusalem shall be taxed as goods imported 
from Israel, or taxed as goods imported from Palestine, or taxed as 
goods imported from Uzbekistan, right? It has complete authority to 
say how they will be taxed. 
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Nothing in that determination reverses, as a formal matter, the 
President’s recognition decision. Justice Kennedy didn’t go that way, 
and I think it’s important that he didn’t. I think he recognized 
something that the dissent really doesn’t take up, but if that line of 
thinking is right, then Congress— 
Professor Segall: Scalia’s, Scalia’s line of thinking. 
Professor Kinkopf: Right. Then—Congress holds the spending 
power. Congress could pass a law then, fully within its spending 
authority, that says, “No money shall be spent to issue a pardon.” 
Congress has the spending power, “Go ahead, Mr. President. Try to 
issue a pardon, but you need paper.” That paper is going to be 
purchased, and that’s the spending power. At some point, Congress’s 
own authorities come into conflict with Presidential power in such a 
way as to undermine the President’s ability to exercise that 
constitutional power. 
Now, where that happens is a very difficult question, and whether 
Justice Kennedy got it right in that case we can argue. But, I think it’s 
an important way to think about separation of powers questions. I 
will say, it’s not the only case where the Court has done that. If you 
look at the Court’s opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, which is a case 
involving the removal power with respect to a board within the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Court in that case—it’s an 
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, but it applies functionalism. 
Justice Roberts begins the opinion by lamenting, “No one has asked 
us to overrule Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison v. Olson, so we 
don’t do that. We apply that framework.” He seems to want to do 
that, but, “No one asks, so we won’t.” 
Professor Segall: Yet. 
Professor Kinkopf: Right. “We won’t, yet.” So, he does the 
functional balancing test that Morrison v. Olson had offered, but he 
does it not with an eye toward deferring to Congress’ judgment or 
deferring to the outcome of the political process. The President 
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signed the law, after all. Instead, he does it with an eye toward 
preserving Presidential power. So, it’s this new functionalism that 
replaces deference to Congress with deference to the President. 
Professor Griffin: I wanted to say, I divide up the cases a little 
differently, but I do see some strong consistencies. Usually, when we 
talk about separation of powers, we imagine we’re talking about 
cases where the Court is coming in between two other branches of 
government, and they’re resolving things just like Zivotofsky. But, 
there was another very important theme for Kennedy’s service on the 
Court, already mentioned by quite a few people, which is a 
reaffirmation of the judiciary’s role. 
This was not only important to cases like Boerne. Arguably, it 
undergirds his approach to the detainee cases, where he’s against the 
Bush administration, and the Bush administration got tired of losing, 
but they kept losing, and they kept going back to Congress. Congress 
arguably—and the President—were cooperating. Arguably at the 
zenith of their power is a case like Boumediene. But, Kennedy kept a 
part of the majority, kept turning them down. 
So, that deserves its own comment, but there is a consistency in 
Boerne and Dickerson, United States v. Morrison, even I add in Bush 
v. Gore, which is a strong reaffirmation that the judiciary is a player 
here, “We’re going to wait—we’re going to weigh in.” Kennedy was 
always on that side all the way through. 
The other consistency, to me, is that Kennedy was always a fan of 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown. There’s a slightly 
earlier case involving, I believe, the use of the death penalty in the 
military, Loving v. United States. It’s useful for laying out his 
approach to separation of powers. To me, especially when you add 
on the foreign policy function, I don’t divide up the cases so much 
formalist or functionalist. I look at them in terms of, “Are you talking 
about a shared power approach, or an exclusive power approach?” 
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Zivotofsky arguably rests on the recognition of an exclusive power, 
the recognition power. But Kennedy’s general approach, perhaps I’m 
operating on a high theoretical plane here, but Kennedy’s general 
approach in that case is very clear, it’s a shared power approach. He 
says, “I’m resolving this case totally consistently with Jackson’s 
concurrence. I’m adhering to my earlier line, but this just happens to 
be a very rare situation where, actually, the President does have an 
exclusive power.” But the general framework is still one where he’s 
not going to decide the case just on that basis. He is going to look at 
Congress’s role and consider those interests in tandem. I see that as a 
very consistent approach on his part. 
Professor Segall: Steve wrote me an email talking about the festival 
of judicial supremacy that Justice Kennedy championed. I wish I 
called this conference that. The festival of judicial supremacy would 
have been about the most accurate title for this. Do you want to 
weigh in on that? 
Professor Somin: Yes. I’m not as much of a separation of powers 
scholar as I’m a federalism scholar. It may be for that reason that I 
see less consistency in the separation of powers jurisprudence of 
Kennedy than in the federalism jurisprudence. I can see how 
sometimes he says the President has a really important power and we 
defer to him for formalist reasons and sometimes functional ones as 
well. On the other hand, the detainee cases don’t seem to fit that very 
well, particularly in Boumediene, where he goes against not only the 
President but Congress also. 
So, at the very least, there’s another variable here, which is 
whether he thinks that there was some important individual right that 
needed to be protected, like habeas, or whether he thought that the 
political process was prone to abuse,  as he quite correctly probably 
thought that it was in this instance.  Neither Congress nor the 
President was likely to care about the interests of non-Americans, or 
even perhaps sometimes American citizens captured in the War on 
Terror.. 
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I don’t think he had a clearly integrated vision of how separation 
of powers was supposed to work in the way that, I think, he did, to 
some extent at least, have a clearly integrated vision of federalism. 
So, you see inconsistencies. You also see that in the travel-ban case, 
which was discussed on the previous panel. That was a case where, 
first, what the President was doing in some ways went against what 
Congress had said, that you can’t discriminate on base of nationality 
in issuing visas. He was willing to go along with the majority in 
sweeping that under the rug. 
Second, even more egregiously, he went against the whole pattern 
of his prior jurisprudence in other discrimination cases, including 
other cases where discrimination was a matter of intent and not 
necessarily a matter of what was in the text of an order or a statute. 
As Eugene Volokh suggested in a previous panel, he may have done 
that because he thought there’s a difference between immigration and 
other things. But, that’s not only a formalistic distinction, it’s a 
formalistic distinction that is nowhere to be found in the text of the 
Constitution.  It is another somewhat ad hoc consideration relative to 
the rest of his jurisprudence. I think it further reinforces how his 
separation of powers jurisprudence did not have the kind of 
consistency that at least a lot of his federalism jurisprudence did. 
Professor Segall: I don’t think anyone today, and I might be wrong, 
has suggested that Justice Kennedy cared much about the text of the 
Constitution. Steve, did you want to—? 
Professor Griffin: Well, I just think the detainee cases are really 
interesting. Why does—if especially once the Bush administration 
teams up with Congress, something that didn’t happen initially—why 
do they keep losing? My understanding is there are high level 
officials in the Bush Administration who seriously considered after 
Hamdan, telling the Court, “Go soak your head. We’re not interested 
in complying with your vision.” But part of it, from a Kennedy point 
of view, would be, they’re not simply making detainee policy, 
they’re also attacking the judicial sphere by refusing to allow us to 
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put our oar in. There could be a theme there of liberty and rights, but, 
to me, it’s subsumed, in at least Boumediene, to a fear on his part that 
the sphere of the judiciary is being compromised. It was an 
aggressive attack, an encroachment, an obvious encroachment on the 
power of the judiciary. 
The other thing about the detainee cases, I think, that’s very 
important to keep in mind is, true, other political branches are acting 
together, but how much explanation are they really giving, to the 
Court or the American people, for the course of action they’re taking 
at Guantanamo? Souter points this out. Other people point this out. 
From the Court’s point of view, these detainees, whatever you think 
about them, are just languishing. They don’t really have—especially 
early on—they don’t really have any plan. They deserve a plan. They 
don’t really have any plan, and furthermore, they’re not really 
explaining to the American people, not only what’s going on at 
Guantanamo but what’s going on with respect to the War on Terror. I 
think that’s still causing us problems, actually. 
Professor Segall: Go ahead, Neil. 
Professor Kinkopf: So, I think Boumediene’s a really important case 
for these purposes, and it ends with this pay-in to Marbury v. 
Madison, that the Constitution—the government cannot turn the 
Constitution on and off. Clearly, I think, Justice Kennedy has in mind 
the torture memo, which was released after oral argument in Hamdi 
but before the Supreme Court issued that decision. I can’t imagine 
overstating the impact that must have had on the Court. Clearly, 
that’s what he has in mind with Boumediene, that the plan in that and 
other documents that had come out is, “We want to hold people in 
places where they won’t have constitutional protections.” 
So, you have an executive branch that’s trying to dodge the law, 
which seems problematic on a host of levels, not the least of which is 
the one you’re pointing out: judicial supremacy. So, Kennedy thinks, 
“They’re hiding them from us. We have to be here to uphold 
individual rights, and that’s our authority and our power.” 
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But then, you contrast that, as Ilya does, with the travel-ban case, 
where Justice Kennedy writes his separate statement saying, “Well, 
that just makes it all the more important that the executive branch 
takes seriously the idea that the Constitution applies here, that we’re 
out of it.” There are real echoes between that and his opinion in 
Alden v. Maine, where he upholds sovereign immunity in both 
federal and state court for state employees, bringing Fair Labor 
Standards Act claims. But he notes, “Of course, Garcia is still good 
law, the Fair Labor Standards Act still applies to state employees, 
and I’m sure the states won’t violate it.” 
Professor Segall: I want to talk about Boumediene just in a more 
practical sense. Lee Epstein—and Lee’s in the next panel—Lee 
Epstein, Erwin Chemerinsky, and I we were on a panel in March of 
the year that Boumediene came out. We were all asked what we 
thought about Boumediene, how it would come out. We all said, 
“Well, ask Justice Kennedy.” Then, I suggested that he was going to 
take a very anti-formalist, functionalist approach and rule against the 
executive branch. But in fact, isn’t it true that much of Boumediene is 
symbolic, in the sense that—what the Court did in that case is it said, 
“The prisoners at Guantanamo Bay have more rights than the 
Congress had given them to appeal to the D.C. Circuit,” but they 
didn’t spell out what they were, not a burden of proof, not on how 
they’re going to establish their innocence. 
Then, the D.C. Court of Appeals, for years, and years, and years, 
dismisses almost every claim and doesn’t give anybody any rights, 
and, it gets worse, the Supreme Court never takes cert. again, of any 
prisoner case in the face of public statements by D.C. Circuit judges, 
that, “You need to take responsibility for the decision you issued, and 
tell us what to do with these cases because we’re not going to let 
alleged terrorists go.” They never took a case again. So, is it judicial 
supremacy or is it judicial symbolism? 
Professor Griffin: Well, you’re talking about Judge Randolph, I 
think. 
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Professor Segall: Among others. 
Professor Griffin: Yeah. Well, I have a great deal of sympathy for 
that position. That used to be my position. Then I ran into Steve 
Vladeck. He has some good evidence that, right, the Supreme Court 
didn’t take another case, but there were multiple levels here. One 
level is, there was action in the district courts, and another level is, in 
the executive branch, my strong impression is that, executive branch 
lawyers and the White House got tired of losing. So, they started to 
wind the whole thing down. It can’t be a coincidence that the number 
of detainees at Guantanamo starts winding down, and down, and 
down after Boumediene. 
I think Vladeck makes a strong case that the Supreme Court’s 
reaffirmation of what I’m normally cynical about, the rule of law, did 
in fact make a difference. 
Professor Segall: Or President Obama coming into office. 
Professor Griffin: Right. But, he had some of the same incentives—
incentives, in other words, not to let these people go at all because 
then you’re worried. The fact is that the numbers kept dropping, just 
as they kept dropping in the Bush administration. 
Professor Somin: A couple of points on this. One is, before 
Boumediene but after the previous detainee cases, the executive 
branch did, in response to previous cases, set up so-called—I may get 
this terminology wrong—but I think it’s “combatant status review 
boards,” which did release a good many people. Scalia actually 
complains about this in his Boumediene dissent, and says some of 
those people may even have gotten back into the fight for the 
terrorists. I think it did have an effect. 
Even if you do explain those decisions as just symbolism, there’s 
still a deep contradiction with the travel-ban case. Why didn’t he at 
least issue a symbolic striking down of the travel ban? Trump might 
then have come back and had a more limited travel ban with less-
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egregious rhetoric, and maybe they could have upheld that down the 
line.  
Even on symbolism, there’s a tension there, but also, all these 
other elements that were mentioned were in tension. One is judicial 
supremacy, or the threat to judicial supremacy, was definitely there in 
the travel ban, too. The administration was saying, you have to defer 
to us nearly absolutely. 
Also, the rational for the policy, frankly, was far more laughable 
and far more obviously pretextual in the travel-ban case than in these 
detainee cases. The travel ban rationale, frankly close to fraudulent 
and contradicted Trump’s own repeated statements of what the real 
purpose was. Whereas, in the Bush administration, I think many of 
them, perhaps wrongly, but many of them did genuinely believe that 
this was necessary to prevent terrorists from getting back into the 
fight. 
So, the concerns that led him to make one decision in Boumediene 
and other detainee cases were ones he was willing to sweep under the 
rug in the travel-ban case, except to the extent that he said these are 
concerns, but we can’t do anything about them. So it’s all up to the 
executive. 
Professor Segall: I do want to tell everybody that Ilya, who is a 
devoted member of the Federalist Society, has written a tremendous 
amount of great scholarship, blog posts, and other things about the 
travel ban and has been very critical right from the beginning of the 
travel ban. I think that’s admirable because it may go against your 
normal politics. 
Professor Somin: It doesn’t actually, but thanks. 
Professor Segall: Okay. We have fifteen minutes before questions, 
and I’m dreading the next topic, but we simply have to do it. There 
was a case, a very, very important case, that raises both federalism 
and separation of powers questions. That’s the Boerne case. It is so 
hard—we’ve discussed this—it is so hard to teach to students. It is so 
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hard to communicate what this case is about. But, it is an 
unbelievably important case, and it has to do with, or it should have 
to do with, what the word “appropriate” means in § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment through appropriate legislation. 
In the early and mid-1960s, in a series of voting rights cases, the 
Court said that appropriate more or less meant rational basis, very 
deferential. As long as Congress has any reasonable reason for 
regulating under § 5, it could do so. Then we get to the Boerne 
decision, and everything changes, and Justice Kennedy writes it and 
ratchets up the level of review quite a bit in striking down how the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act applies to the states. 
With that background, how important—and then going forward the 
Court struck down a bunch of federal laws on the same rationale. 
How important is this case? Is it consistent with the rest of 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence, and is that going to remain the law for a 
while? Those are my questions. 
Professor Somin: I think it is a very important case, at least 
potentially. I don’t think it’s actually that difficult to explain in that 
Kennedy, and I think the other conservatives on the Court, were very 
concerned that you don’t want to let the federal government have 
nearly unlimited power, whether it’s based on the Commerce Clause, 
and the idea that everything interstate commerce, or by the 
mechanism that almost anything can be brought through as a way of 
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. What I think this is really 
about, and this is the phrase that I use to my students, maybe you 
guys teach it in a different or better way, but I think what the real 
principle here is that you can’t use an elephant gun to shoot a mouse. 
In the 1960s, when you had the Voting Rights Act and other civil 
rights legislation, there really was a massive, elephant-sized violation 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments going on: Jim Crow 
segregation, suppression of black voters, and so forth. Therefore, the 
Court was quite properly willing to let Congress take pretty drastic 
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measures because there really was a huge elephant out there, and they 
needed a lot of buck shot to bring him down. 
By contrast, in City of Boerne v. Flores, what you have is the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act saying that any state laws that 
burden religious observance substantially would be struck down 
unless they could be justified by a compelling state interest. At least 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Smith decision, which was 
talked about in a previous panel, only a tiny fraction of those state 
laws actually violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. So essentially, a huge number of state laws were 
potentially threatened in order to get at a very small number which, 
in the Supreme Court’s view, actually violated the Constitution. I 
think that’s the better way to understand that decision, and arguably 
subsequent decisions, in this vein as well. 
I think it makes a good sense, and it is consistent with the rest of 
his federalism jurisprudence, unless you just generally believe as 
some people still do, that federalism issues should just be left to the 
political process, which Kennedy I think, correctly, did not believe. 
Professor Griffin: I just have two observations about the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act. I was lucky enough—at the same time it 
was being passed, I was able to have a long conversation with Doug 
Laycock, who I believe was sort of the brains—a lot of the brains—
behind it. I was very taken aback by the way it was written, and I was 
lucky—I didn’t really have any strong convictions about it. I was just 
wondering, I’m not sure it’s reprinted in the—I think it was reprinted 
in the case that literally, the statute said, “We don’t like employment 
of—we want to restore Sherbert,” but then, they actually cited—I’ve 
never seen a statute written like that before. 
Now, Laycock explained that he wouldn’t have written the statute 
in that way if he had been in total control, but he explained the 
Voting Rights Act rationale behind it, so that it was a civil rights 
measure. I too didn’t see as much reason for it, but then, I draw a 
connection. I don’t often do interest group analysis, but I draw a 
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connection between asking just a basic question that bothered me in 
Zivotofsky, which never got answered to my satisfaction, why did 
Congress pass that law about passports? Why did Congress pass 
RFRA? To me, the most straightforward answer is kind of a sop to 
interest groups who were very, very upset. It’s not clear that they had 
strong reason for being very upset, but there’s no doubt that their 
version of the legal status quo was grossly violated by Employment 
Division v. Smith. 
They were very, very upset, but they weren’t able to develop a 
strong rationale in the hearings, and so on. I never got a straight 
explanation from anybody why they passed the law in Zivotofsky. 
Sometimes Congress just does things because interest groups are 
bothering them. That doesn’t create a very strong record for the 
Supreme Court. Whereas Voting Rights Act, of course, the efforts to 
register people weren’t just recent, they extended back decades. 
There’s a strong record there. 
Professor Kinkopf: Well, in connection with Zivotofsky, the statute 
says, “Declaration of the status of Jerusalem as part of Israel.” So, I 
don’t know about the motive behind adopting that policy, but when it 
comes to the Court’s review of whether this conflicts with the 
President’s recognition power, there it is in black and white, that 
that’s what Congress meant to do with it. They weren’t just saying, 
“We’re exercising our power in our sphere. You can recognize as you 
see fit.” 
With respect to Boerne, I think the important point is, first, the 
Court saw what Congress was doing as a threat to its own power, first 
and foremost. 
Professor Segall: Absolutely, I agree. 
Professor Kinkopf: So, much of the opinion is devoted to a 
discussion of substantive versus remedial legislation. That, it’s the 
Court’s job to declare the substance of what it is that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects, not Congress’s. Congress can then enact 
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remedial legislation that provides, in a prophylactic way, protections 
of the rights that the Court has found and declared, which is why the 
statute saying we mean to overrule Smith, is a big problem for the 
statute. 
So really, I think fundamentally, it’s a separation of powers case 
much more than a federalism case, and that is how the Court sees it. 
Although in the course of deciding Boerne, Justice Kennedy 
articulates, once again, his privity theory of federalism, that the 
federal government now is interfering in the relationship between 
states and their citizens in a way that he found problematic. 
Professor Segall: I would like to point out that in all three of these 
answers, including yours, and I think I might agree with your policy 
description of the case, but the reality is—my legal realism coming 
out—that the text of the Constitution uses the word “appropriate” in 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We knew prior to Boerne what 
appropriate meant, and it meant reasonable and rational, not 
congruent and proportional. I think that most historians would agree 
that the purpose of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was to give 
Congress the primary responsibility, not the Court, of enforcing the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
All I’m suggesting there is text, history, and, of course, precedent, 
which the Court basically reversed in Boerne, all mitigated in one 
direction, and the four conservatives, plus Justice Kennedy, 
eventually went in future cases in the other direction. Go ahead and 
respond to that. Talk about appropriate—talk about the word 
appropriate. 
Professor Somin: Sure. I do agree that the precedent used words like 
“reasonable” and “rational.” Those words are not actually in the 
Constitution. They certainly, I don’t think, were intended or 
understood to be adopted in the 1860s. It is true that Congress is 
supposed to have a lead role in enforcement, absolutely. But a lead 
role in enforcement does not mean a lead role in defining the scope 
of the actual substantive rights. It just means a lead role in enforcing 
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those rights that actually are protected by the Amendment, as 
opposed to chopping down a whole lot of other state laws and 
activities that are not related to the amendment. 
Now, by the way, I do actually disagree with Employment Division 
v. Smith. So in a certain sense, Congress was right to complain about 
that. But, unless we want to say that the Supreme Court not only 
doesn’t get to define the scope of rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment but also doesn’t get to define the scope under the Bill of 
Rights, then Congress is essentially saying, “This right is vastly 
broader than the Court has said it is, and we can adopt legislation on 
that basis.” That’s extremely problematic, and not just in the case of 
the word “appropriate” but in other parts of the Constitution, as well. 
To my mind, “appropriate” means appropriate to enforcing those 
particular rights, not appropriate in the sense of anything the 
Congress might think is rationally desirable or useful. 
I think the ‘60s precedents, while they used words such as 
“rational,” it is important to understand that it was in the context of 
the big elephant that was out there that they were hunting. When the 
elephant is not there, this rational basis approach seems much more 
questionable. 
Professor Kinkopf: I guess I would just put in with saying who gets 
to decide whether the problem is a mouse or an elephant? I think the 
term appropriate indicates that that is Congress’s judgment, and the 
Court ought to defer to it. The Court requiring proportionality and 
congruence gives the Court a far greater role, far more power, makes 
them, to use the popular terminology, far more activist than I think 
the use of the word appropriate in the text of the Amendment itself 
envisions. 
Professor Segall: Thank you, because I was going to say that. It is 
time for questions. 
Professor Eugene Volokh: So, I wanted to ask a few questions to 
Steve— 
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Professor Segall: Introduce yourself again. 
Professor Volokh: Sorry. Eugene Volokh, UCLA Law School. So, I 
believe that City of Boerne v. Flores was the only case, at least the 
only one that I know of, in which Justice Ginsburg or Justice Stevens 
ever concluded that a congressional act was beyond the enumerated 
powers of Congress, setting aside the Bill of Rights. So, I wanted to 
know what thoughts you’ve had about that because, for the 
conservatives, minus Justice O’Connor, who agreed with them on the 
federalism point but just thought that it was because she was a 
dissenter in Smith, it was just enforcing what effects the Free 
Exercise Clause means all along. So, I’d love to hear what you have 
to say about it. 
I wanted to turn briefly to the Raich case, though. It’s true, seven 
of the nine Justices, conservative and liberal alike, actually voted the 
same way in the medical marijuana case as in the gun free school 
zones case. But at least as to the eighth, Justice Scalia, he offered an 
explanation, and I think it was touched on, I think Steve by you, but I 
think it just seemed pretty plausible, not necessarily right, but at least 
plausible, which is that once you allow some people who have 
medical marijuana cards, and in my recollections, they’re very easy 
to get in California. 
Professor Segall: How would you know? 
Professor Volokh: That was just my sense of it. I have never gotten 
one or needed one. So, once you do that, everybody can say, “Oh 
yeah, I’ve got these drugs on me officer. Here’s my medical 
marijuana card. I’m growing them.” I suppose you could say, “Well, 
you can grow this much but no more,” but Scalia, I think, makes a 
very powerful argument. Also, Scalia, he wasn’t a hardcore drug 
warrior. He had a few years before and Von Raab mocked that drug 
wars raises everything point. He had done later—had later opinions 
as well. So, why just assume that they don’t like women, they like 
guns, they don’t like marijuana? 
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Again, for seven of the nine, that doesn’t seem to explain it, but on 
top of that, why not just think that there may be a difference there? 
Professor Segall: On that point, since you’re directing it at me, and 
it’s late in the day— 
Professor Griffin: I thought it was directed at me. 
Professor Segall: No, no, the Scalia point, you have to then put back 
in NFIB and ask yourself why the federal government has the power 
to regulate the private, non-commercial use of marijuana that is never 
going to cross state lines. That part of it is not part of a commercial 
enterprise. But then, Scalia votes that the federal government does 
not have the power to regulate a $1 trillion industry affecting the 
commerce and the economies of every state in the country. I’ll throw 
that back at you because I can’t possibly see a reason Congress can 
do the former but not the latter. 
Professor Volokh: If Justice Scalia were here, I think he would say, 
“Of course they have the power to regulate the industry. They have 
the power to regulate the industry in lots and lots and lots of different 
ways.” Just for various reasons, which you may not find terribly 
persuasive—I didn’t find terribly persuasive—but he articulated, not 
this particular way. You might think of it as it’s necessary and proper 
is the requirement, that this is not proper. 
But, when it comes to the marijuana, you say, regulate medical 
marijuana that will never be shipped across state lines, he talks about 
this. He says, “We have no idea, we have no way of knowing 
whether a particular piece of medical marijuana is going to be 
shipped out.” When you’re talking about contraband, the easiest, the 
most effective, probably the necessary, under the loose sense of 
necessary, way of regulating contraband is ban it all together. That 
really makes perfect sense whether or not one thinks it’s good 
practice. 
Professor Somin: I’ve written about this quite a good deal, let me 
very briefly summarize. What Scalia says, unlike Kennedy, who 
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simply joined a ridiculous definition of interstate commerce in the 
majority, Scalia says that the Commerce Clause by itself doesn’t 
reach this, but it can be reached with the help of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. I agree with you that it may match the word 
“necessary,” which the Supreme Court has defined as just useful or 
convenient. But, in both the Raich concurrence and later, again, in 
NFIB, Scalia says that   proper is a separate constraint. Something 
can be necessary but not proper. 
He says that the reason why the individual mandate is not proper is 
because the logic of it implies this massive additional great and 
independent power to mandate the purchase or doing of any activity 
that Congress might want to force people to do. Similarly in Raich, 
he doesn’t even consider the possibility that this restriction might be 
improper even if it’s necessary. But by his logic, I think it pretty 
clearly is, because his logic implies— 
Professor Segall: You’re saying that it is improper? 
Professor Somin: It’s improper, yes. 
Professor Segall: So, he’s inconsistent in two cases. 
Professor Somin: Yes. 
Professor Segall: So, it might be about guns and pot and— 
Professor Somin: It might be. But my point is that the logic of the 
argument that he endorses in Raich is that Congress can ban the 
possession of pretty much anything for fear that, if they don’t 
completely ban it, it might cross state lines. Banning even the in-state 
possession of anything is as much a great and independent power as 
requiring the purchase of things. So, it seems like his logic in the two 
cases is inconsistent. And especially egregious is that, even though in 
Raich he says that “proper” is an independent limitation, he doesn’t 
even give any real consideration to the question of whether this is 
improper, even though Randy Barnett’s brief for Raich actually does 
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discuss why this would be improper under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
Professor Segall: So glad you’re here. 
Professor Volokh: The agreement and kind of subtle and interesting 
and complicated questions of how to interpret those terms, rather 
than real proof that he just doesn’t like drugs. 
Professor Somin: I don’t know whether he just didn’t like drugs or 
not. I think he made an egregious mistake in Raich by not even 
considering the possibility that this might be improper, given that he 
himself clearly thinks that a distinction between “necessary” and 
“proper” is extremely important. 
Professor Segall: Do you guys want to address the silliness of proper 
being a serious limitation on the necessary and proper power of 
Congress because—talk about a standard-less standard, which Scalia 
would normally object to. 
Professor Kinkopf: Right, although, it depends where the Court 
goes with proper. Certainly from Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, 
proper means unconstitutional or inconsistent with our constitutional 
system of federalism. Now, maybe in some future case that’s going 
to be expanded in a way that’s problematic, but if it just means 
violates principles of federalism then okay you say that the law is 
improper. But, I don’t want to pass on this without noting that the 
joint opinion that Scalia and Kennedy signed in NFIB says that the 
individual mandate is not necessary. It doesn’t just say it’s not 
proper. It says, there are all kinds of other ways Congress could do 
this, which would be a radical departure from our understanding of 
what necessary means from McCulloch on up to the present day, if 
the Court actually takes that and runs with it. I think there’s every 
reason to expect that they might. 
Professor Segall: Steve, do want to—? 
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Professor Griffin: Well actually, Eric, I wanted to take a point of 
personal privilege to thank you, again, not only for inviting all of us 
here to this great conference but for somehow moderating four panels 
by yourself. It would cause me to expire. So, I hope it’s okay with 
everyone if I just say thank you. Thank you, Eric. 
Professor Segall: With that—the program doesn’t say we’re going to 
take a break now, but we’ll take a quick, five-minute break and come 
back for our last panel of the day. Thank you very much. 
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